

Multi-layer Cloud Architectural Model and Ontology-based Security Service Framework for IoT-based Smart Homes

Ming Tao^a, Jinglong Zuo^{b,*}, Zhusong Liu^c, Aniello Castiglione^d, Francesco Palmieri^d

^aCollege of computer and network security, Dongguan University of Technology, Dongguan, China

^bCollege of Computer and Electronic Information, Guangdong University of Petrochemical Technology, Maoming, China

^cSchool of Computer Science and Technology, Guangdong University of Technology, Guangzhou, China

^dDepartment of Computer Science, University of Salerno, Via Giovanni Paolo II, 132 I-84084 Fisciano (SA), Italy.

Abstract

The Smart Home concept, associated with the pervasiveness of network coverage and embedded computing technologies is assuming an ever-growing significance for people living in the highly developed areas. However, the heterogeneity of devices, services, communication protocols, standards and data formats involved in most of the available solutions developed by different vendors, is adversely affecting its widespread application. In this paper, promoted by several promising opportunities provided by the advances in Internet of Things (IoT) and Cloud Computing technologies for facing these challenges, a novel multi-layer cloud architectural model is developed to enable effective and seamless interactions/interoperations on heterogeneous devices/services provided by different vendors in IoT-based smart home. In addition, to better solve the heterogeneity issues in the presented layered cloud platform, ontology has been used as a promising way to address data representation, knowledge, and application heterogeneity, and an ontology-based security service framework is designed for supporting security and privacy preservation in the process of interactions/interoperations. Challenges and directions for future work on smart home management have been also discussed at the end of this paper.

Keywords: Smart Home, Heterogeneity, IoT, Cloud, Ontology, Security.

1. Introduction

The idea of smart home, defined as an intelligent environment that is able to acquire and apply knowledge about its occupants and surroundings to provide more humanized services and make home life more comfortable, safe and energy-efficient, has been considered as a challenging research and industrial topic for many years [1]. In a typical smart home setting, multiple (and often proprietary) devices and service platforms developed by different vendors, using heterogeneous communication protocols and standards, are deployed. Such heterogeneous devices and service platforms, however, need to be fully interoperable in order to support the joint and harmonized execution of household operations. Traditionally, to cope with heterogeneity issues, gateway technologies have been widely applied. In detail, a number of gateways need to be configured to convert a protocol into another one and/or re-map operational data between different formats. Unfortunately, these mediation and conversion operations significantly slow down the performance of the involved devices and often limit the degree of integration among them, so that, developing new strategies and architectural models to provide effective and seamless interactions/interoperations between heterogeneous hardware and software solutions in the smart home environment, still remains a fundamental challenge. Due to their significant impacts on the whole information and communications technology (ICT) scenario, the

*Corresponding author: ZuoJingL@126.com

Email addresses: taoming6723@126.com (Ming Tao), ZuoJingL@126.com (Jinglong Zuo), liuzs@gdut.edu.cn (Zhusong Liu), castiglione@ieee.org (Aniello Castiglione), fpalmieri@unisa.it (Francesco Palmieri)

25 recent advances in IoT and cloud computing technologies have provided some promising opportunities for
26 addressing such challenge [2].

27 In our specific scenario, IoT does not refer to a single technology but, instead, to a new paradigm charac-
28 terized by the pervasive presence around us of a variety of objects (referred as ‘things’) participating into the
29 domestic activities, such as radio frequency identification (RFID) tags, sensors, actuators, mobile phones,
30 connected each other by using a common multi-service converged IP network [3] and be able to interact and
31 cooperate in order to achieve common home-related goals [4, 5]. Recently, the technological advances in
32 IoT have fostered the rapid development of devices, services and applications that are perfectly suitable for
33 smart homes [6]. These new devices and components are aimed to support new efficient and fully integrated
34 services that leverage the existing ubiquitous and pervasive communication and computing facilities char-
35 acterizing the home cyber environment. In fact, their convergence within the Internet arena significantly
36 accelerates the massive deployment of various smart devices, appliances and solutions for automating and
37 processing the information required by specific home services. However, the integrations of these home
38 devices and services in specific domains characterized by strong cross-platform interactions/interoperations
39 needs have resulted in several administration and operational problems, and, at the same time, the available
40 communication platforms and hardware/software solutions empowering these services are still evolving and
41 growing in quantity, by exacerbating the aforementioned interactions/interoperations issues.

42 Cloud computing, based on the concepts of converged infrastructure, unlimited scaling, elastic and shared
43 services, can be the immediate response for the high dynamic nature, resiliency and adaptivity needs char-
44 acterizing the processing and storage demands of the smart home [7]. Such runtime and storage capabilities
45 are of paramount importance for implementing the aforementioned integrated intelligence facilities in the
46 home scenario by transforming the traditional service provisioning model and facilitating the processing and
47 storage of home-related data, as collected by the sensing/control and monitoring devices and/or available
48 in most of the modern services/facilities (e.g., environmental monitoring, energy management, surveillance,
49 lighting control, assisted living, entertainment, etc.). In the past few years, researchers have proposed some
50 solutions that leverage cloud computing for implementing smart home systems accommodating multi-vendor
51 services based on the service-oriented architectural model (SOA) [8]. These systems provide a number of
52 software services (e.g., home management or home device control) re-mapped in a typical Software-as-a-
53 Service (SaaS) cloud architecture to satisfy different requirements of household life. Such services are now
54 required to interact with each other in order to exchange information and provide a solid basis for imple-
55 menting collaborative home service in a fully distributed Internet-based environment (e.g. an intelligent
56 building or, better, a Smart City) that reflects the organization of modern societies.

57 It should be also noted that the use of both IoT and cloud computing in smart home is still in its
58 early stage and most of the existing proposals have not fully exploited the potential of these technologies
59 for supporting interactional/interoperable architectures and solutions. To this end, we propose to use
60 a combination of both the technologies as the enabling infrastructure for developing a multi-layer cloud
61 architectural model for IoT-based smart home, in which, all the interactions/interoperations issues on the
62 heterogeneous devices and services provided by different vendors will be properly solved in a systematic
63 way. Indeed, we also argue that the combination of the semantic modeling and service-oriented technologies
64 can support both interactions/interoperations and scalability in the above scenario. Accordingly, ontology
65 has been identified as one of the most promising means that can be used to address data, knowledge, and
66 application heterogeneity as well as to construct the security-oriented service framework in smart home
67 environments.

68 The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we provide a brief review of the applications
69 of IoT and cloud computing technologies in the smart home environment. In Section 3, a multi-layer cloud
70 architectural model for IoT-based smart home is firstly developed to improve scalability and provide the
71 interoperability for multiple home devices and services from different vendors. In Section 4, in the pre-
72 sented layered cloud platform, an ontology-based security service framework to handle heterogeneity for
73 effective and seamless interactions/interoperations is developed, concretely, smart home domain ontology
74 and ontology-based device description model are firstly defined, on the basis, Semantic Web Rule Language
75 (SWRL) is used to define the reasoning rules needed to implement the mutual understanding and interac-
76 tions/interoperations on the heterogeneous devices and services, and ontology-based security management

77 is then designed to achieve security and privacy preservation in the process of interactions/interoperations.
 78 In Section 5, evaluation of the proposed layered cloud architectural model, and proofs of security & privacy
 79 requirements within the proposed ontology-based security service framework are performed. Challenges and
 80 directions for future work on smart home management are discussed in Section 6. Section 7 presents our
 81 conclusion.

82 2. IoT and Cloud Computing in Home Intelligent

83 IoT explains a future in which a variety of physical objects and devices around us, such as various
 84 sensors, RFID tags, positioning facilities, and mobile devices will be associated to the Internet, and allows
 85 these objects and devices to connect, cooperate, and communicate within social, environmental, and user
 86 contexts for achieving common goals [9, 10]. As an emerging technology, IoT is expected to embed computer
 87 intelligence into the devices needed for conveniently managing modern home environments.

88 In recent years, some preliminary works using IoT technologies to design and implement smart home have
 89 been presented. Ghayvat et al. [11] present a universal IoT-based smart home model, in which, all the home
 90 devices and appliances are connected together and the home network is the integration of different wireless
 91 technologies. Soliman et al. [2] and Lin et al. [12] present a smart home approach which consists of embedding
 92 intelligence into sensors and actuators by using the Arduino platform, and networking smart things by using
 93 ZigBee technology. By integrating IoT and service component technologies, Li et al. [13] present a smart
 94 home system architecture which has considered the heterogeneous information fusion in IoT. Lee et al. [14]
 95 focus on security issues in IoT-based smart home system, including physical security, information acquisition
 96 and transmission as well as processing security to ensure the confidentiality, completeness and authenticity
 97 to the whole system.

98 Cloud computing has also been employed to reshape home services and applications in the home automa-
 99 tion domain. As more and more home devices from different vendors are equipped with on-board modules
 100 that can access the Internet, new solutions emerged to integrate existing home networks, various sensors,
 101 on-board modules in home devices, home gateways and cloud computing for creating smart-home-oriented
 102 clouds. They suggest that smart-home-oriented clouds are technologically feasible and will have a significant
 103 impact on the family and society once they are built. Thus, both existing home applications and a variety
 104 of information resources are being virtualized and packaged into services which are often combined and used
 105 to implement the mapping, encapsulation, aggregation, and composition facilities allowing home devices to
 106 interact/interoperate each other in order to perform joint execution of household operations.

107 Using the modular multi-layer approach and SOA to integrate various home services and applications re-
 108 vealed to be one of the most promising options available for building smart home cloud platforms, the smart
 109 home architecture proposed by Wu et al. [15] is a peer-to-peer (P2P) model based on multiple Open Services
 110 Gateway Initiative (OSGi) platforms, where SOA and mobile-agent (MA) technology are used to support
 111 the interactions between system components. Also OSGi-based, Cheng et al. [16] proposed an extensible
 112 architecture for heterogeneous smart home systems enabling dynamic integrations of devices, services and
 113 protocols. By taking into account of the distributed nature of the home environment with heterogeneous
 114 devices, Perumal et al. [17] presented an integrated approach using the SOAP/XML protocol for implement-
 115 ing effective web-service-enabled smart home management systems. Considering privacy protection issues
 116 in cloud platforms, Fabian et al. [18] proposed a peer-to-peer (P2P) infrastructure for organized sharing and
 117 private querying of data formed by many smart devices operating across several homes, whereas Kirkham et
 118 al. [19] proposed a risk-driven integrated home device management approach to achieve wider data sharing
 119 between the home and external services.

120 With the technological advances of both IoT and cloud computing, a new generation of solutions leverag-
 121 ing both IoT and cloud computing technologies has been developed to bring many benefits into smart home
 122 management. With the home growing and efficient energy concerns, Kau et al. [20] propose a cloud-based
 123 technology to perform remote control and monitoring of electrical appliances on the Internet. Respective
 124 using ZigBee-based energy measurement modules to monitor the energy consumption of home appliances
 125 and PLC-based renewable energy gateway to monitor the energy generation of renewable energies, Han et
 126 al. [21] propose a smart home energy management system (HEMS) architecture. By using communication

and sensing technologies, and machine learning algorithm, Hu et al. [22] present a hardware design of smart home energy management system (SHEMS) to detect consumers activities and intelligently help consumers lower total payment on electricity without or with little consumer involvement. With the single resident and elderly care concerns in smart home, Benmansour et al. [23] present an overview of existing approaches and current practices for activity recognition and the latest developments and highlights of the open issues in this field. Suryadevara et al. [24] model a framework of activity recognition by using forecasting and reasoning methods to analyze the sensed temporal and spatial contextual information, which allow timely detection of the anomalous behaviors of the elderly and take corrective actions accordingly. Wu et al. [25] firstly make use of spatial features together with temporal features to discover useful representative activity instances, and then use learning algorithms [26, 27, 28] to do activity recognition model adaption. Cloud- and IoT-based frameworks and approaches integrating ontology methodologies for activity monitoring in smart home scenarios have attracted many research interests as well [29, 30].

While acknowledging the achievements of applying IoT and cloud computing technologies in home intelligent in these proposals, which have been found to be efficient, in this paper, to address the issue of enabling effective and seamless interactions/interoperations on heterogeneous devices/services from different vendors in IoT-based smart home, a novel layered cloud architectural model is proposed, moreover, in which, ontology-based approach is employed to better solve the heterogeneity issues, and an ontology-based security service framework is designed on the basis to achieve effective security and privacy preservation in the process of interactions/interoperations.

3. Multi-layer Cloud Architectural Model for IoT-based Smart Homes

In presence of an ever-growing amount of information sources in the smart home scenarios, structured in multiple sensing and control platforms/applications connected through several wireless and wire communication facilities, the fundamental challenge consists in collecting, integrating, aggregating and processing the huge amount of data originated by these sources in order to transform them in the knowledge needed by smart services provided in the modern home. This may imply managing many heterogeneous devices and protocols/technologies as well as performing cross-platform harmonization of their produced data, that becomes really feasible only by relying on the virtually unlimited storage and computing resources provided by cloud infrastructures. Furthermore, the virtualization facilities provided by clouds can significantly boost the limited computing capacity of hardware-constrained sensing or actuator devices making them be able to handle the complex processing tasks needed by modern smart home applications.

Currently, from various considerations, the vendors of home devices and appliances prefer to develop proprietary smart home platforms reflecting their own interests. These platforms often bring their own solutions and service interfaces, such that different communication protocols and standards are typically deployed within each solution. Hence, interconnecting heterogeneous devices and services provided by different vendors, and providing seamless interactions/interoperations across the available platforms remain the main challenges.

Building a public cloud based platform providing virtualization of the involved objects and their interfaces, and allowing their orchestration into generalized on-demand smart home services, may be an effective strategy for facing the above challenges and avoiding conflicts between the different private platforms characterizing the legacy vendor solutions.

Figure 1 shows the layered scheme of our proposed cloud architectural model for IoT-based smart home. Generally, different layers have different purposes and the bottom layers provide foundational supports for the top layers. By integrating under a common cloud-based platform, various IoT devices, e.g., sensors, actuators, controllers, mobile phones, and other home appliances, interconnect by using the available wireless (e.g., Bluetooth, RFID, ZigBee, Wi-Fi, 3/4G, LTE, etc.) and wire communications technologies [31, 32]. A specific middleware stratum is used to hide the implementation details of the underlining technologies and to provide support for the integration of specific applications deployed on the smart home cloud. SOA here will also be employed to integrate different information and connect multiple devices from different vendors seamlessly through the smart home cloud. SOA allows smart home application developers to organize, aggregate and package applications into new advanced home services. In each legacy private platform, the




Figure 1: The layered cloud architectural model for IoT-based smart home.

177 used communication and access protocols and standards, as well as the device registration, authentication,
 178 management and manipulation methods, are individuated by the vendors. In the public cloud, providing
 179 the virtualized service and device/object interfaces for third party access to home services and devices, the
 180 platform bus implements protocol conversion and addressing operations with the IDs for all the registered
 181 devices in the platform. By leveraging such SOA- and IoT-based smart home cloud platform, innovative
 182 services can be developed by device vendors, government agencies and third-party service providers.

183 In the designed multi-layer cloud platform for IoT-based smart home, when the customer wants to
 184 manipulate a home device, the following two scenarios should be considered.

185 The operating process in the first scenario that the consumer and the target device are associated to the
 186 same private platform is shown in Figure 2, and the crucial operating procedures are simply described as
 187 follows.




Figure 2: An illustration of the operation process in the scenario that the consumer and the target device are associated to the same private platform.

- 188 (i) The customer uses the vendor-specific companion *App* installed on the smart phone to send an operation
 189 command to the associated private platform directly.
- 190 (ii) The *DeviceID* of the target device will be locally checked at first in such (presumably private cloud)
 191 infrastructure. If the target device is managed by the same associated private platform and the
 192 operation command is achieved on a legitimate basis, the operation command will be forwarded to the
 193 target device associated to it (e.g., connected to the corresponding private cloud).
- 194 (iii) After completing the requested manipulation, the target device sends its current status to the associ-
 195 ated private platform. The relevant parameters about the current operating status of the target device
 196 then will be reported to the platform bus in the public cloud.
- 197 (iv) The platform bus synchronizes the device status with all the other associated private platforms.

198 The operating process in the second scenario that the consumer and the target device are associated to
 199 different private platforms is shown in Figure 3, and the crucial operating procedures are simply described
 200 as follows.




Figure 3: An illustration of the operation process in the scenario that the consumer and the target device are associated to different private platforms.

- 201 (i) The customer uses the vendor-specific companion *App* installed on the smart phone to send an oper-
 202 ation command to the associated private platform directly.
- 203 (ii) The *DeviceID* of the target device will be at first checked locally in such infrastructure. If the target
 204 device is not managed by the private platform associated by the consumer, the operation command is
 205 forwarded to the platform bus in the public cloud.
- 206 (iii) The platform bus then forwards the operation command to the corresponding private platform by
 207 performing the addressing operation with the *DeviceID*, and the operation legality will be verified
 208 in the private platform associated by the target device. If the operation command is achieved on a
 209 legitimate basis, it will be forwarded to the target device associated to it.
- 210 (iv) After completing the requested manipulation, the target device sends its current status to its associated
 211 private platform. The relevant parameters about the current operating status of the target device then
 212 will be reported to the platform bus in the public cloud.
- 213 (v) The platform bus synchronizes the updated device status in the whole cloud platform just as stated
 214 above.

215 From the above specifications, we can clearly see that, by checking the *DeviceID* of the target device
 216 in the private platform associated by the consumer, if the target device and the customer are associated
 217 to the same private platform, the associated private platform can directly trace the target device, and
 218 the operating process is relatively simple; otherwise, if the target device and the customer are associated
 219 to different private platforms, the public cloud platform will execute the addressing operation with the
 220 *DeviceID* of the target device and redirect the operation command to the private platform associated by
 221 the target device. After accomplishing the requested operation on the target device, the relevant parameters
 222 about the operating status will be synchronized in the whole cloud platform. Accordingly, we can come
 223 to a conclusion that, with such a multi-layer cloud architectural model, by generalizing the scope of each
 224 individual service represented by using an Internet-like structure and integrated into a common IoT service
 225 fabric for sharing and reusing in multiple operating household contexts, and enabling data collection and
 226 exchange among different platforms, interactions/interoperations among all the registered home devices and
 227 services from different vendors, it allows the seamless interworking of the legacy platforms (typically private
 228 clouds) provided by different vendors through the aforementioned public cloud layer, and real-time, cheap
 229 and on-demand home services could be efficiently enabled.

230 4. Ontology-based Security Service Framework

231 In the IoT-based smart home, the proposed mediation platform based on multi-layer cloud architectural
 232 model provides seamless interworking for the home devices from different vendors. Starting from such basis,
 233 ontology is used as a promising way for addressing data, knowledge, and application heterogeneity in the
 234 available devices in order to realize the aforementioned virtualized smart home service framework [33]. Such
 235 ontologies are able to model and describe the different aspects of the IoT resources involved in the smart
 236 home by defining their semantic properties, the information they can supply or the actions/controls they
 237 can perform. To this end, the smart home domain ontology and an ontology-based device description model
 238 are firstly defined in this section, on the basis, Semantic Web Rule Language (SWRL) is used to define the
 239 reasoning rules needed to implement the mutual understanding and interactions/interoperations among the
 240 heterogeneous devices and services, and ontology-based security management is finally discussed to achieve
 241 security and privacy preservation in the process of interactions/interoperations.

242 4.1. Domain Ontology of Smart Home

243 The smart home domain ontology is structured through a set of correlated concepts abstracted from the
 244 smart home scenario, but independent of any particular technology or implementation. In terms of the level
 245 of abstraction, the concepts are classified into several levels realizing a hierarchical structure. To the best
 246 of our knowledge about the services offered in smart home scenario, as shown in Figure 4, the top layer
 247 structure capturing the general features of home entities is defined as the following ontologies developed by
 248 Protégé, *Home_device*, *Entertainment*, *Environment*, *Data_communication* and *Security*. The home services
 249 corresponding to *Home_device* include automatic cooking and cleaning, household environment monitoring,
 250 surveillance, etc.. To make daily home life convenient, as well as improving efficiency and implementing
 251 energy savings policies, the *Environment* services are mainly related to managing temperature, humidity
 252 and lighting by providing automatic adjustment and adaption or remote control of air conditioning, lights,
 253 gas and other unnecessary appliances running in standby mode or being turned off in the case of leaving
 254 the house. The *Entertainment* services include providing various audio-visual feasts for the householder at
 255 any time, automatically recording family TV programmer preferences, quickly accessing into the network
 256 for interactive services, etc.. The *Security* services are mainly related to raising alerts and delivering them
 257 to householder via phone or Internet, and triggering relevant solutions to protect house safety when there
 258 are abnormal home situations, besides, supports a high abstraction level for dealing with security objectives
 259 in the process of interactions/interoperations. The *Data_communication* services mainly encompass data
 260 sharing between the home and external services via Internet, data exchanging between the home devices via
 261 short-distance wireless communications technology, etc..

262 The details of general concepts and their features in each sub-domain are defined in the low-level struc-
 263 ture of smart home domain ontology. *Home_device* for example, is the abstraction of device entities in smart




Figure 4: The top level structure of smart home domain ontology.

264 home, whose structure and concepts are shown in Figure 5. In the *Home_device* concept, the associated
 265 *Smart_Home_device* and *Common_Home_device* concepts are defined, together with their sub-concepts. Ad-
 266 ditionally, the inheritance relations between concepts are indicated by the solid arrow and the non-inheritance
 267 relations are indicated by the dotted one. For clarity sake, in Figure 5, only the non-inheritance relations of
 268 *Gas_sensor* are presented as examples, and the specific explanations of the defined non-inheritance relations
 269 will be illustrated in the following. *Environment* concept and its low-level concepts are shown in Figure 6,
 270 which has four low-level concepts: humidity, smoke, temperature and gas. Similarly, the basic concept and
 271 the low-level ones of *Entertainment*, *Data_communication* and *Security* can be defined in the same manner.




Figure 5: *Home_device* concept and its low-level concepts.

272 In the aforementioned smart home domain ontology, each abstracted concept is characterized by its prop-
 273 erties and its relations with other concepts. To achieve the interactions/interoperations on the heterogenous
 274 home devices and services, the relations between concepts to be used as the basis of reasoning, should be
 275 defined. By considering *Gas_sensor*, for example, as shown in Figure 7, the two mutually-inverse relations
 276 of ‘sensor’ and ‘sensedby’ are defined for *Gas_sensor* and *Gas*. If *Gas_sensor* detects that the abnormal
 277 gas concentration exceeds the pre-defined standard threshold, *Gas_Exhaust_device* would be triggered to
 278 exhaust the abnormal gas. Hence, the two mutually-inverse relations of ‘trigger’ and ‘triggeredby’ should be
 279 defined for *Gas_sensor* and *Gas_Exhaust_device*. Similarly, since *Gas_Alarm_device* would be triggered by
 280 *Gas_sensor* in the same manner, the two mutually-inverse relations should also be defined for *Gas_sensor* and
 281 *Gas_Alarm_device*. Additionally, *Gas_Alarm_device* and *Gas_alarm* have the two mutually-inverse relations
 282 of ‘cause’ and ‘causedby’.

283 4.2. Ontology-based Device Description Model

284 In the process of interactions/interoperations on heterogeneous devices, for taking full advantage of their
 285 specific capabilities in order to support self-description and automated communication features, a description




Figure 6: *Environment* concept and its low-level concepts.




Figure 7: The relations between *Gas_sensor* and its neighbor concepts.

286 model of devices' capabilities (which could be processed and understood by other entities) should be provided.

287 The devices in smart home are characterized by many related information, such as function, location,
 288 content, status and controller. Therefore, six related ontologies are constructed in the device description
 289 model shown in Figure 8, namely *Device*, *Function*, *Content*, *Location*, *Status* and *Controller*. The
 290 embedded device functions are described in the ontology of *Function*. All the possible device statuses are
 291 defined in the the ontology of *Status*. The locations of devices are the individuals of *Location* ontology.
 292 The content, such as a condition or a context needed to select which device implements a specific operation
 293 is defined in the the ontology of *Content* [34]. The identity of the authorized controller and the assigned
 294 control competence are defined in the *controller* ontology. The *Device* ontology can communicate with
 295 other ontologies through the object properties.

296 Moreover, the basic device information is defined by the *DeviceDescribeFile* class shown in Figure 9. The
 297 basic device information includes *DeviceName*, *DeviceID*, *DeviceType*, *Output*, *AccessURI*, *DriveURI*,
 298 *AccessPermission* and *Interface*. In the presented multi-layer cloud architectural model for IoT-based
 299 smart home, *DeviceID* should be divided into a local ID used in the proprietary platform, and a private
 300 ID and a public ID taken as the identifiers used for recognizing the device identity and achieving resource
 301 identification in different layers. Similarly, each *AccessURI* should be divided into local URI, URI in private





Figure 8: Device description model.

302 cloud (associated to the legacy platform) and URI in public cloud, and can give an entry point for accessing
 303 the command and operation list of the devices available in the different layers. *AccessPermission* also
 304 should be divided into local permission, permission in private cloud and permission in public cloud, and
 305 would be used to implement security and access control in the different layers.

Figure 9: *DeviceDescribeFile* class.

306 4.3. SWRL-based Reasoning Description for Interactions/Interoperations

307 Reasoning is an important inherent function of ontology, and reasoning rules can be added as a part of
 308 the defined ontologies to infer the information implied into them [35, 36]. In this work, to achieve full and
 309 seamless interactions/interoperations on the heterogeneous home devices and services provided by different
 310 vendors, the above defined ontologies and the device description model are respectively taken as reasoning
 311 foundation and reasoning object. SWRL is used as the tool of choice for defining the reasoning rules necessary
 312 to implement the mutual understanding and interactions/interoperations among the involved heterogeneous
 313 devices and services [37].

314 For example, the reasoning rule for detecting and handling abnormal gas concentrations is defined in
 315 Figure 10 (a). If the gas sensor at somewhere detects that the gas concentration exceeds a pre-defined
 316 standard threshold, the gas exhausting device would be triggered and the alarm flagging the presence of
 317 abnormal gas would be triggered as well.





Figure 10: Reasoning descriptions for detecting and handling abnormal gas and fire alarm.

318 Similarly, the reasoning rule for fire alarm is defined in Figure 10 (b). If the smoke sensor at somewhere
 319 detects that the smoke concentration exceeds a pre-defined standard threshold, or the temperature sensor
 320 detects that the environment temperature exceeds another pre-defined threshold, the water sprinkling device
 321 and fire alarm device would be triggered.

322 4.4. Ontology-based Security Management for Interactions/Interoperations

323 In the developed cloud architectural model for IoT-based smart home, complexity of interactions/interoperations
 324 between the service providers and customers still impose significant security requirements. To satisfy the
 325 security and privacy requirements, it is prerequisite to elaborately design relevant security polices to achieve
 326 security and privacy preservation [38]. Here, by developing the ontology of *Security* that defines a common
 327 security vocabulary shared by service providers and customers, ontology-based security management for
 328 supporting effective and security interactions/interoperations is discussed.

Figure 11: The ontology of *Security*.

In Figure 11, the ontology of *Security* is presented, which consists of the main classes, properties, associations and relationships, and supports a high abstraction level for dealing with security objectives for interactions/interoperations. Certainly, it can be enriched with additional security technologies by introducing new classes and properties. In the defined ontology, the top-level class named *Security* has some properties, mainly including *SecurityObjective* and *KeyCarrier*. The *SecurityObjective* class indicates the security objectives (e.g., integrity and confidentiality) in the process of interactions/interoperations, which can be captured in the ontology by defining two subclasses, *Integrity* and *Confidentiality*. The mechanism of digital signature as a technique is represented by *DigitalSignature* class and is associated with the security objective of integrity. It has the following properties. *Digest* class is used to capture digest algorithms including instances, i.e., MD5 (Message Digest Algorithm), SHA1 (Secure Hash Algorithm), SHA256 and SHA 512. *Signature* class is used to represent instances of signature algorithms, including DSA-SHA1(Digital Signature Algorithm-SHA) and RSA-SHA1 (Rivest Shamir Aldeman-SHA). *Transformation* class is used to specify transformation algorithms including instances, i.e., XSLT (eXtensible Stylesheet language Transformation), XPath (XML Path Language), Enveloped Signature, SOAP (Simple Object Access Protocol) Message Normalization and Security Token Reference (STR) Dereference Transform. *Canonicalization* class includes these instances, such as, XML Canonicalization and Exclusive XML Canonicalization. The mechanism of encryption as a technique is represented by *Encryption* class and is associated with the security objective of confidentiality. It has the following properties. *KeyAgreement* class is used to specify key agreement algorithms including Diffie-Hellman instance. *KeyTransport* is used to represent key transport algorithms including these instances, such as, RSA-v1.5, and RSA-OAEP (RSA-Optimal Asymmetric Encryption Padding). *EncryptionAlgorithm* class is used to capture encryption algorithms, which has two subclasses, *BlockEncryption* and *StreamCipherEncryption*. The former includes these instances, i.e., 3DES (Triple Data Encryption Standard), AES-128 (Advanced Encryption Standard), AES-192 and AES-256, while the instance, i.e., RC4 (Rivest Cipher), is included in the latter one.

Because both signature and encryption should use security keys, *KeyCarrier* class is introduced to represent mechanisms of carrying security keys. As a common used carrying mechanism of keys, tokens are employed to hold keys within or outside of the messages in the process of interactions/interoperations, and *SecurityToken* class as a subclass of *KeyCarrier* is defined. Because different types of tokens have different manners of attaching them to the messages, *SecurityToken* has the following three subclasses. *UsernameToken* class provides a method of verifying usernames in the process of interactions/interoperations. *BinaryToken* class defining binary-formatted security tokens includes two properties. Note that, *EncodingFormat* property defines the encoding formats of tokens. *XMLToken* class defines XML-based security tokens, and *Assertion* as its subclass represents security assertions.

Based on the above defined ontology of *Security*, security policies can be designed to indicate the abilities of interactions/interoperations between the service providers and customers along with the security management in the developed cloud architectural model for IoT-based smart home. Specifically, from different perspectives, both service providers and customers should define different policies describing security properties in the process of interactions/interoperations, and different policies should be able to achieve intersections to enable the implementation of interactions/interoperations with reasonable security levels.

```

<p: Policy>
  <p: ExactlyOne>
    ( <p: All>
      ( <Assertion ...> ... </Assertion> )*
    </p: All>*)
  </p: ExactlyOne>
</p: Policy>

```

Figure 12: Normal form of security policy.

369 The normal form of designed policies including indispensable components is shown in Figure 12, where,
 370 p is a prefix for the namespace URI of policies, *Policy* is the root element indicating a policy, *ExactlyOne*
 371 as an operator is used to gather policy alternatives represented by *All* operators, *Assertion* as the elements
 372 gathered by *All* operator are used to represent the security requirements put forwarded by customers or the
 373 service security capabilities released by providers, they can use the concepts defined in the *Security* ontology.
 374 In addition to these indispensable components, the following general-purpose components can be included
 375 in the policies to facilitate the manipulation, i.e., either *Name* attribute or *ID* may be used to represent
 376 the identification of a policy, *Service* elements may be contained in a policy of provider to represent the
 377 service implementation, or contained in a policy of customer to represent the requested component services
 378 and interaction/interoperation capabilities, *Reference* element may be used to nest the content of a policy
 379 into another policy.

380 In the process of interactions/interoperations, the intersection operations among defined security policies
 381 that are compatible are usually necessary to determine the services released by providers whose security
 382 policies are suitable for customer policies. Determined by using OWL-based operators, if the capability of a
 383 assertion of one policy alternative could satisfy the requirement of a assertion of another policy alternative,
 384 the two assertions belong to different policy alternatives would be compatible and the two policy alternatives
 385 could be taken as compatible ones, and at least, if a pair of alternatives between two policies are compatible,
 386 the two policies would be taken as compatible ones as well.

387 With the developed *Security* ontology and designed security policies, in the case that a service customer
 388 imposes the ontological concept of *Confidentially* into the policy corresponding to a component service in
 389 the process of interactions/interoperations, the confidentiality preservation must be enabled in the service
 390 implementation. Examples of encryption assertion and token assertion extracted from a policy for the service
 391 implementation are shown in Figure 13. Encryption assertion indicates that the body of service content is
 392 encrypted by using one kind of encryption algorithms, i.e., AES-128, and the encryption mechanism will
 393 use one kind of tokens with some encoding format defined in token assertion. As shown in the example of
 394 token assertion, the token of X.509 PKI Path Version 1 with the format encoded by Base64 is used.

Example of encryption assertion	Example of token assertion
<pre><sec:AES-128> <sec:Token> <sec:Reference URI="#" X.509PKIPATHToken "/> </sec:Token> <sec:EncryptedParts> <sec:Body/> </sec:EncryptedParts> </sec:AES-128></pre>	<pre><sec:X.509PKIPATH-v1 u:Id=" X.509PKIPATHToken" EncodingFormat="sec:Base64"/></pre>

Figure 13: Examples of encryption assertion and token assertion.

395 5. Experiments and Analysis

396 5.1. Evaluation of Layered Cloud Architectural Model

397 To qualitatively analyze and evaluate the performance of multi-layer cloud architectural model which is
 398 proposed to address the issue of interactions/interoperations, we design a prototype consisted of a public
 399 cloud provided by Amazon EC2, a private smart home cloud platform supported by Guangdong University
 400 Scientific Innovation Project and built in Dongguan University of Technology (DGUT), and a private smart
 401 home cloud platform authorized by Canbo CO., LTD, China. As shown in Table 1, the two private platforms
 402 are constructed by employing completely different cloud architectures, concretely, the former is constructed
 403 using some open-source solutions, and the latter is constructed using VMware solutions. In addition, in the

404 first private platform, the deployed home devices and appliances using different network access technologies
 405 are provided by different vendors; in the second private platform, the deployed kitchen and bathroom devices
 406 and appliances are the independent productions of Canbo CO., LTD, but the other kinds of deployed home
 407 devices and appliances are provided by different vendors and use different network access technologies. For
 408 effective and seamless interactions/interoperations in the same associated platform or across the heteroge-
 409 neous platforms in smart home environment, the response time defined as the maximum execution time
 410 taken by systems tasks is significant and crucial for real-time home manipulation applications. Accordingly,
 411 the performance of the proposed layered cloud architectural model is measured with respect to the response
 412 times of home manipulations.

Table 1: Configurations of private smart home cloud platforms

Private platform	Configuration parameters			
	Hardware configuration	OS	Virtualization software	Management software
DGUT	CPU: Intel Xeon E3-1231v3 RAM: 16GB Storage: 1TB	Ubuntu Server 12.04 LTS	KVM	OpenStack
Canbo	CPU: Intel Xeon E7-4850v3 RAM: 128GB Storage: 15TB	Ubuntu Server 16.04 LTS	VMware vSphere	VMware vCenter

413 In the prototype, considering two different network situations, e.g., without any loads and with loads
 414 (512kbps), the response times in the two scenarios that the consumers and the target devices are associated
 415 to the same private platform (shown in Figure 2) and the consumers and the target devices are associated
 416 to different private platforms (shown in Figure 3) are show in Figure 14. In the two scenarios, total of
 417 500 testing samples of home manipulations are performed respectively. The further analysis results of the
 418 response times are shown in Table 1. From Table 2, we can clearly see that, within the proposed layered
 419 cloud architectural model, the test values of average response time are justified for the requirements of home
 420 manipulation applications, especially for the interactions/interoperations across heterogeneous platforms.




Figure 14: The response times in two different network situations.

421 5.2. Proofs of Security & Privacy Requirements

422 In this section, the proposed ontology-based security service framework is analyzed with respect to the
 423 critical security and privacy preservation requirements.

424 1) In the proposed layered cloud platform, only the registered entities (e.g., home devices and *Apps*)
 425 from different vendors can generate valid certificates including *IDs* and public keys, consequently, other

Table 2: Comparisons of response times.

Performance evaluation		Scenario shown in Figure.2	Scenario shown in Figure.3
Average response time (ms)	Without any loads	23.68	52.36
	With loads (512kbps)	35.06	66.38
Standard deviation (ms)	Without any loads	6.93	8.68
	With loads (512kbps)	11.58	15.63

426 illegal entities cannot eavesdrop using different *IDs* and public keys. Therefore, we can conclude that the
 427 verification requirement could be satisfied.

428 2) For mutual authentication between the entities before the process of interactions/interoperations,
 429 with the instances of signature algorithms contained by *Signature* class, the legitimate entities partici-
 430 pating into the interactions/interoperations could generate valid signatures based on the generated keys,
 431 with which, the participant entities could mutually determine the identities and proceed with normal in-
 432 teraction/interoperation sessions consequently. Therefore, the proposed ontology-based security service
 433 framework also satisfies the requirement of mutual authentication.

434 3) With the defined subclasses and contained instances in the *KeyCarrier* class, session keys in the
 435 process of interactions/interoperations could be only shared between the authorized entities within the
 436 whole expiry period. Thus, data confidentiality and integrity in the sessions can be ensured.

437 4) With the contained instances in the defined *DigitalSignature*, *Encryption* and *SecurityToken* sub-
 438 classes, the private information of participant entities could be effectively protected during the process of
 439 ongoing authentications or interaction/interoperation sessions. Moreover, because the participant entities
 440 will trigger the next interactions/interoperations by applying for new session keys, eavesdroppers or adver-
 441 saries are also unable to correlate the sessions and derive previous or subsequent interrogations. Therefore,
 442 strong anonymity and untractability of the participant entities within the proposed ontology-based security
 443 service framework could be efficiently ensured.

444 5) A majority of well-known security attacks could be efficiently prevented. For example, with the
 445 contained instances of digest and signature algorithms, the generated shared secret authentication and
 446 session keys can efficiently defeat *impersonation* attacks and *repudiation* attacks. Similarly, with the
 447 contained instances of key agreement algorithms, adversaries could not decrypt the encrypted message
 448 with the private key owned only by the certified entities in the process of interactions/interoperations,
 449 *Man-In-The-Middle(MITM)* attacks can also be defeated; because the shared secret keys for ongoing
 450 interaction/interoperation sessions are different and will be regenerated for newly initiated sessions, the
 451 well-known key attacks can be prevented as well. Finally, with the contained instances of transformation
 452 algorithms and key transport algorithms, *redirection*, *replay* and *injection* attacks all could be efficiently
 453 resisted.

454 6. Challenges and Future Work

455 New architectures and platforms for smart home management, such as the cloud- and IoT-based one
 456 proposed in this work must be provably efficient, scalable, secure and reliable before starting their large-
 457 scale deployment. Existing mechanisms and approaches, however, are not yet fully satisfactory in meeting
 458 all these requirements at the same time. There are still some serious challenges described as follows.

459 i) *Global standards for architecture, device interconnection, service integration*

460 Since there are a number of stakeholders such as device and service vendors involved in smart home
 461 clouds, and there are complex dependencies among these stakeholders as well, global standards are essential
 462 to avoid incompatibilities and conflicts between privately developed platforms and solutions. However,
 463 establishing global standards to lower the complexity and make smart home clouds more compatible and
 464 cost effective, remains a challenge. Further efforts on standardization should be conducted to coordinate

465 various resources for implementing more effective smart home clouds and reducing the number of adaptations
466 and mediation stages.

467 ii) *Scalability, performance and technology integration*

468 The effectiveness of smart home clouds depends on their scalability in handling a dynamically growing
469 number of homes. Apart from handling regular operations of home devices, smart home clouds must be
470 able to face the ever-growing demands for home entertainment and some other applications, and provide
471 the interactions/interoperations among the heterogeneous devices and services from different vendors, such
472 that further and more advanced developments aimed at optimizing the utilizations of computing, storage
473 and network resources are needed. Meanwhile, the realization of optimization algorithms that coordinate
474 the private platforms/clouds with the public one to achieve real-time cross-layer data synchronization and
475 minimize the traffic overhead between layers is necessary as well. In addition, with the launch of new home
476 devices and technologies each year, developing effective IoT middleware that supports integration of these
477 new technologies and devices with the existing ones will be challenging.

478 iii) *Security and privacy*

479 Security and privacy are other fundamental concerns within smart home clouds. A low security level is
480 clearly unacceptable for home services regarding operations safety and people health. For example, when
481 we go out for some time, unnecessary services such as air conditioning, lights, gas and other appliances
482 will be put in standby mode or turned off to save energy and protect house safety, however, the attackers
483 may maliciously send from the outside many fake requests to some specific device or cloud service, by
484 bringing serious threat to house safety. Therefore, reliable and well-balanced security frameworks preventing
485 unauthorized access or disclosure of home privacy, are needed to enhance the security and trust of cloud
486 services without limiting the overall system flexibility. Additionally, reasonable efforts in law and regulations
487 are also needed to effectively provide security guarantees in the smart home sector.

488 **7. Conclusion**

489 Undoubtedly, smart home technologies are changing and improving people's life experience. However,
490 the increasing heterogeneity issues seem to restrict their widespread application. Starting from these consid-
491 erations, in this work, a novel multi-layer cloud architectural model is developed for IoT-based smart home,
492 which provides a substantially improved degree of interactions/interoperations between heterogeneous home
493 devices and services provided by different vendors. In addition, in the developed layered cloud architectural
494 model, ontology is used to discuss how new household services can be constructed in order to make the smart
495 home platforms more useful and better solve the heterogeneity problems introduced by the use of different
496 devices/solutions to implement effective and security home services.

497 Such IoT- and cloud-based platforms are expected to be the backbone of the future smart home with
498 the ultimate goal of making home living experience more comfortable and enjoyable. However, research
499 on integrating IoT and cloud computing within the smart home scenario is still in its infancy and the
500 existing studies on this topic are still insufficient. To make IoT and cloud enabled smart home platforms
501 be more useful, new advanced home services, e.g., home device remote monitoring and control, multimedia
502 entertainment, etc., need to be developed and reasonably deployed, and business intelligence should be
503 massively introduced in the smart home ecosystem. Additionally, there are still a number of challenges
504 to be faced when developing future integrated smart home scenarios, such as lack of global standards,
505 scalability, performance as well as security and privacy. Because of the complexity involved in addressing
506 these challenges, the collaboration among academia, home device companies, law enforcement organizations,
507 government authorities, standardization groups and cloud service providers, as well as a systematic approach
508 in engineering new architectures and operating schemes, are definitely needed. Although the problems that
509 are still open are very severe, IoT and cloud computing provide tremendous opportunities for technology
510 innovation in the smart home industry, and will serve as enabling infrastructures for developing a new
511 generation of network-centric home services where the participating home entities are distributed on a
512 metropolitan area scale and cooperated in a federated way within the future smart cities.